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We consider a Keynes-Goodwin model of e®ective demand and the distributive
cycle where workers purchase goods and houses with marginal propensity signi¯cantly
larger than one. They therefore need credit, supplied from asset holders, and have
to pay interest on their outstanding debt. In this initial situation, the steady state is
attracting, while a marginal propensity closer to one makes it repelling. The stable
excessive overconsumption case can easily turn from a stable boom to explosiveness
and from there through induced processes of credit rationing into a devastating bust.
In such a situation the Central Bank may prevent the worst by acting as creditor of
last resort, purchasing loans where otherwise debt default (and bankruptcy regarding
house ownership) would occur. This bail-out policy can stabilize the economy and
also reduces the loss of homes of worker families.
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11 Introduction
Success breeds disregard of the possibility of failures. The absence of serious
¯nancial di±culties over a substantial period leads ... to a euphoric economy in
which short-term ¯nancing of long term positions becomes the normal way of
life. As previous ¯nancial crisis recedes in time, it is quite natural for central
bankers, government o±cials, bankers, businessmen and even economists to
believe that a new era has arrived. (Hyman P. Minsky, Can "It" Happen
Again? Essays on Instability and Finance, 1982, p.213).
As it is widely acknowledged, the current ¯nancial crisis in the USA was originally
triggered by an excessive expansion of mortgage loans to households in order to purchase
real estate. The main di®erence with the traditional Minskyan crisis and the actual U.S.
¯nancial crisis is here that borrowers are not ¯rms but households. Indeed, while for
example the Japanese crisis was characterized by ¯rms and banks borrowing to invest in
real estate, and the East Asia crisis was characterized by ¯rms and banks borrowing foreign
denominated debt, in the current crisis, ¯nancial fragility leading borrowers from hedge-
to speculative- and Ponzi positions have involved the households' income and interest
payments signi¯cantly.
There are three main factors which explain the large increase in mortgage credits
over the last years in the U.S. economy: Competition between ¯nancial institutions, the
interaction between real estate price and credit awarding as well as the proliferation of
securitization. Jointly, these three elements induced banks to relax screening and moni-
toring of borrowers and to increase the quantity of credit supplied to households. First,
in the aftermath of the crash of the dotcom bubble in 2000 and in an environment char-
acterized by low interest rates, banks, under the pressure of ¯nancial intermediaries such
as hedge funds, found in mortgage debt a highly pro¯table business. Second, increasing
real estate prices (and the expectation of further increases) contributed signi¯cantly to an
excessive expansion of credit to, under otherwise normal circumstances, borrowers with
insu±cient creditworthiness. The increasing collateral's value reduced default risks and
led banks to increase credit, along the lines of the ¯nancial accelerator model. And lastly,
the widespread of securitization up to an unprecedented level lowered dramatically the
practice of borrowers' screening and monitoring by banks (in 2006, securitization concerns
87% of prime mortgages and 75% subprime mortgages (Ashcraft and Schuermann (2007)).
Securitization aims at transforming loans into liquid assets in order to transfer the
credit risk to the market. Mortgages with di®erent qualities are mixed together and
2the resulting ¯nancial products are sold to the market through SPVs (special purpose
vehicules) in the form of CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) or RMBSs (residential
mortgage backed securities) for instance.
The widespread of securitization had dramatic consequences for the credit markets:
On the one hand, the belief that credit risk could be transferred without further problems
to the market led banks to expand credits supplied, leading to a worsening of the average
quality of loans. In addition, securitization reduced the need of banks to increase their own
funds following credit expansion. In a traditional banking sector, banks are exposed to
credit risk and must provision reserves to cover the risk accordingly. As risks were trans-
ferred to the market, banks were not forced to provision for risks. Although securitization
was supposed to reduce banks exposure to risk, securitization induced banks to take more
risks, in fact. As a result, low income households were able to access credits, the so-called
subprime mortgages. While subprime borrowers accounted for 9% of borrowers in 2000,
this proportion increased to 20% in 2006 (Dell Ariccia, Igan and Leaven (2008)). This
large increase in subprime mortgage debt produced a deterioration of the income of these
type of households, not yet considered in the present model, and soaring debt default.
In this paper, we leave aside the role played by real estate prices, risky ¯nancial innova-
tions and subprime debt default. We study instead as a baseline exercise the macrodynamic
features of worker household debt accumulation and debt crisis, being our main focus the
understanding of the dynamics between worker households' overconsumption and debt,
their interest payments, their real wage dynamics and e®ective demand.
For this we set up a basic model characterized initially by stable, but later on by
unstable excessive overconsumption of worker households. Credit then becomes rationed
and the economy diverges { if this occurs { even more from its initially stable steady state
position. We then consider actions that rescue the economy from this instability scenario
and lead it back to economic stability, based on investment stimuli and monetary policy
regarding the loan and the default rate on the credit market.
Our focus on overconsumption and debt is however not new altogether: Palley (1994)
and Dutt (2003, 2006) are earlier studies in the Keynesian macrodynamics tradition which
have analyzed the short- and long-run e®ects of workers' overconsumption and debt. How-
ever, while Palley (1994) on the one hand focuses on the double-sided character of workers
indebtedness, showing that an increase in workers' indebtedness increases aggregate de-
mand on the one hand due to higher consumption, but is also likely to depress it on the
other hand due to the larger debt-service payments from debtors to creditors (which as
traditionally assumed in Neo-Kaleckian models, have a lower propensity to consume), and
3Dutt (2003, 2006) on the other hand, focuses on the short- and long run e®ects of such
a development,1, the (un-)sustainability of \conspicuous" consumption was not explicitly
addressed in both approaches. In contrast, the innovation of this paper is the explicit
analysis of credit rationing to workers as a result of over-indebtedness as well as the role
of (bailout) monetary policy for economic stabilization after such a credit crisis.
The starting framework of the paper is a Goodwin model of the distributive cycle with
a single commodity (that can used for consumption and investment purposes, including
housing investment), in which households' debt is introduced in order to assess when it
adds stability and when instability to the baseline dynamics. Moreover, the economy is
restricted by a Keynesian e®ective demand function, since the act of saving (by asset
holders) di®ers from the act of investment (by ¯rms). We thus here integrate a Goodwin
type con°ict about income distribution with a Keynesian goods demand framework, which
is replacing the original supply side dynamics of the Classical growth cycle.
As it will be stressed on several occasions, the central features of this macrodynamic
model, and its application to the study of credit markets and boom-bust cycles, are the
mechanisms generating overheated or depressed goods markets positions. Furthermore,
in contrast to the tradition which stresses the clearing of all markets at each instance of
time,2 in our modeling approach disequilibrium situations are the main driving forces of
an integrated wage/price dynamics. Moreover, disequilibrium e®ects in ¯nancial markets
are often generated by over-leveraging in the real sector, here in the household sector as
well as in the ¯nancial sector of the economy.
Due to the fact that in our modeling approach the stability of the analyzed dynamical
system is not imposed ad initio by rational expectations assumptions (which requires that
the economy always \jumps" to some stable manifold and therefore always converges to
the steady state after any type of shock), its stability properties (and its analysis) are
based on the relative strength of the interacting macroeconomic and ¯nancial feedback
channels, through a variety of di®erent macroeconomic repercussions, showing that there
are indeed di®erent (and also valid) possibilities to specify and analyze the dynamics of
the macro economy in a rather di®erent way than in the standard DSGE framework.
In view of the above quotation from Minsky's work it may therefore well be { if the
last occurrence of an eventually destabilizing overconsumption scenario is su±ciently back
in time (and also covered up by important historical events such as the breakdown of
Eastern type socialism) { that the initially stable excessive overconsumption reappears
1Dutt shows that the e®ect of higher consumer indebtedness on aggregate demand is always positive in
the short run but can ambiguous in the long run.
2An heroic assumption in a continuous-time modeling framework.
4and that the whole process starts again, though possibly in a di®erent historical garment.
The above quotation from Minsky's work is therefore characteristic for the 4 stages of
macrodynamic evolution we are considering in this paper, though the macro-model we
are using is still a very basic one, with commercial banking just represented through asset
holding households, with central banking only considered in very partial and stylized form,
and with speci¯c historical events, such as particularly vulnerable subprime lending still
absent.
2 A Keynes-Goodwin model with mortgage loans and debt default
The model of this section consists of two household types: Workers and capitalists, which
are also the owners of ¯rms. Workers have wage income which they totally spend on
goods consumption (g) and the purchase of houses (h), part of which is ¯nanced through
loans from the capitalists. Their combined marginal propensity to consume: c = cg + ch
is therefore assumed to be larger than one. The workers' real wage income Yw is however
reduced through the interest they have to pay on their actual real loans ¤a
w and the excess
of their spending over this income determines the amount of new loans _ ¤w they need for
their intended purchase of new houses. Since the model allows for debt default this rate
of change is however not the rate of change of actual loans.
We assume a closed economy and do not consider a ¯scal authority in this paper.
Moreover, we treat commercial banking by way of asset holders' behavior only. Central
banking is considered in a ¯nal section and in a very partial way solely. In equations the
model reads as follows:
Workers:







the wage share (1)
Cw = (cg + ch)Yw; c = cg + ch > 1 (2)
_ ¤w = (c ¡ 1)Yw = ¡Sw (3)
_ Kw = chYw ¡ 'bKw; 'bKw = 'd¤a
w (4)
^ L = n = const (5)
We denote in these equations the real wage by !. Labor supply L is subject to natural
growth (with a constant rate n) and employment Ld is determined in the sector of ¯rms
(see below). The symbol i denotes the loan rate on worker's real debt ¤a
w. The demand of
workers of new loans is here not subject to credit rationing (by capitalists), though there is
5debt default of amount 'd¤a
w that depends on the loan rate and that is associated in this
paper with a depreciation of the stock of houses of the amount 'bKw ( this assumption
intends to represent to a certain degree the triggering mechanism of the current mortgage
crisis in the US economy). This loss of housing capital reduces of course the rate of change
of the housing stock of workers as shown in eq. (4).3 Note ¯nally that the consumption
function of workers is the only behavioral assumption that is made in this module of the
model.
Asset Holders:





Cc = 0 [Sc = Yc] (7)
_ ¤a
w = _ ¤w ¡ 'd¤a
w (8)
W = R + K + ¤a
w (9)
_ R = Yc ¡ _ ¤w ¡ I = Sc + Sw ¡ I = S ¡ I (10)
Capitalists { as substitutes for the commercial banking system { do not consume and
use instead their savings (consisting of their real pro¯t income rK; with r the rate of
pro¯t od ¯rms, and their interest income) o proportion a) new loans _ ¤w to workers, b)
new capital goods to ¯rms, or on new reserve holdings _ R:4 They do not ration workers
and ¯rms with respect to their ¯nancing decisions, being thus completely accommodating
with respect to their reserves accumulation in the formulation of the model of this section.
They are therefore passive funds suppliers, who just get the loan rate on their credit supply
(without intermediation by commercial banks), and are thus fairly simple substitutes for
such `commercial banks'. They however set the loan rate for the credit market which by
and large is an exogenous variable in this paper (see however section 6 for an exception).
We stress however that even in such a basic scenario there is room for the occurrence booms
and busts, which may be much more complicated to analyze if asset holding institutions
behave in a more active way. Note ¯nally that the paper abstracts from a resale market
for houses and thus cannot say anything on the occurrence of booms and busts in such a
market (as they preceded the subprime crisis in the US economy).
3This however is not a central assumption of the model, but helps to avoid the consideration of a resale
market for such housing stocks.
4We will assume goods market equilibrium below (S = Sc + Sw = I in terms of net savings and
investment) and can show then that the change in R is always zero. We therefore ignore the variable R
altogether by setting it equal to zero in the following.
6The sector of ¯rms is also still formulated in a very simple manner. Firms produce
output according to e®ective demand Y (by means of a ¯xed proportions technology with
yp the potential output-capital ratio and Ld = Y=z their employment function { with a
given labor productivity z) and are determined in their rate of net investment I=K5 by
the excess of their rate of pro¯t r over the steady state rate of interest ro. Moreover, the
trend term in their investment behavior is simply given by the natural rate of growth in
order to avoid the discussion of how natural growth and capital stock growth adjust to
each other.6
Firms:
u = Y=Y p the rate of capacity utilization (11)
yp = Y p=K = const the potential output capital ratio (12)
z = Y=Ld = const labor productivity (13)




The present paper concentrates on the interaction between indebted workers and credit
supplying asset holders (as a substitute for commercial banks). The sector of ¯rms is
therefore considered as fairly tranquil and not subject to volatile investment behavior.
There is in particular no debt ¯nancing of investment. Instead it is assumed throughout
the paper that asset holders directly invest part of their income into real capital stock
formation and this at a rate that is smaller than one as the impact of excess pro¯tability
(or loss): r ¡ ro is concerned. This gives rise to real growth dynamics of a Goodwin
(1967) type pro¯t squeeze mechanism that can be either wage-led or pro¯t-led as far as
the Keynesian e®ective demand curve (or IS-curve) the model exhibits is concerned. The
debt feedback chain of the economy is therefore integrated with such a Keynes- Goodwin
growth cycle model in this paper and investigated with respect to the consequences it
has in such a framework. We have to admit here that we do not yet integrate state of
con¯dence considerations as in Taylor and O'» Connell (1989), there as far as investment
behavior is concerned, and there is also not yet an explicit impact of the debt to capital
ratio onto the behavioral equations of the model, apart from its appearance in the budget
equations of households. Such issues must be left for future research here.
5depreciation ±K is retained by ¯rms as means of replacement for worn out capital goods.
6We will ignore in this paper all e®ects that can result from changes in the rate of capacity utilization
of ¯rms. This would demand the integration of a wage price spiral as considered in Flaschel and Krolzig
(2006) from the theoretical as well as from an empirical point of view. Such a wage price spiral is also
needed when the steady state assumption yo = y
p; see below, is to derived as an implied condition.
7The ¯nal law of motion of this model of °uctuating growth and indebtedness in the
housing sector concerns the real wage dynamic that drives the real part of the economy in
the form of a real wage Phillips curve (a conventional textbook Phillips curve with myopic
perfect foresight regarding price in°ation):
Real Wage Adjustment:
^ ! = ¯we(e ¡ ¹ e) (15)
As before we denote by ^ x the growth rate of a variable x; i.e., here of real wages. The
variable e = Ld
L denotes the rate of employment, with Y the demand driven output level
of ¯rms. Real wages are driven by demand pressure e¡ ¹ e on the labor market (with ¹ e the
normal rate of employment).
The 3D dynamics implied by the model of the preceding section to be investigated in
this section in a special case, is based on a Phillips curve distributive cycle mechanism
interacting with a Goodwin (1967) type growth dynamics and a law of motion for the debt
to capital ratio of workers:










^ l = ¡¯r(r ¡ ro); r =
Y ¡ vY
K
¡ ± = y(1 ¡ v) ¡ ±; l = zL=K (17)
_ ¸a
w = (c ¡ 1)(vy ¡ i¸a







with the following goods market equilibrium of IS expression for the output capital ratio:
y =
ci¸a
w + ¯r(± + ro) ¡ n ¡ ±







This IS curve is easily obtained from the goods market equilibrium equation
Y = c(vY ¡ i¤a
w) + (¯r(r ¡ ro) + n + ±)K:
by transforming it into intensive form and by solving it for the output capital ratio y:
Note again that the budget equations of the two types of households of the model imply
_ R = 0 if IS-equilibrium is assumed.7 The law of motion for the labor capital ratio l is
7On this basis we have
_ R = rK + i¤
a
w ¡ _ ¤w ¡ I = rK + i¤
a
w ¡ (C ¡ (vY ¡ i¤
a
w)) ¡ I = Y ¡ ±K ¡ C ¡ I = 0:
8easily obtained by means of the standard rules for growth rate calculations. And the law
of motion for the wage share v is a simple consequence of our real wage Phillips curve
when labor productivity is assumed as constant.
We have still a further law of motion, for the ratio kw = Kw=K (which is however also
not feeding back into the above dynamics), which reads:
^ kw = ch(vy ¡ i¸a
w)=kw ¡ [¯r(r ¡ ro) + n] ¡ 'd¸a
w=kw:
This equation shows how bankruptcy of worker households accompanies their debt default
concerning credit they have obtained from the capitalists. Of course these two laws of
motion should feedback into our baseline dynamics in future extensions of the model.
Note here also that there is no resale market for houses in the present formulation of the
model so that houses can be treated as consumption goods and need not be classi¯ed as
investment goods as it is done in the system of national accounts. By assumption part
of the housing stock has been ¯nanced by mortgages, and may therefore be subject to
bankruptcy if there is debt default occurring with respect to such loans.
The reference balanced growth path
Under the assumption that the risk premium ro is given in an appropriate way (to be
determined below), the (in general locally uniquely determined) interior steady state of
the dynamics (16) { (18) is given by:8
yo = yp; eo = ¹ e : lo = yo=¹ e; ywo =



















; ro = (1 ¡ vo)yo ¡ ±
The ¯rst two steady state values are set exogenously. The goods market equilibrium
then gives the equation for workers' income, which in turn can be used to determine the
steady state debt ratio (by setting _ ¸a
w = 0): The steady wage share is then obtained form
the de¯nition of worker's income. Finally. the target rate of pro¯t ro is adjusted in such
a way that this wage share allows for _ l = 0.
If one assumes as special case i = n + 'd one gets in particular:
yo = yp eo = ¹ e : lo = yo=¹ e; ywo =
yo ¡ ± ¡ n
c
; i¸a









yo ¡ ± ¡ n
yo
> 0; ro = (1 ¡ vo)yo ¡ ± = n
8The condition yo = y
p is an assumption that can only be proved to be valid if a more complete
framework is used that allows to integrate in°ation and anti-in°ationary monetary policy. The condition
on ro is therefore here used as a substitute for the introduction of a larger theoretical framework.
9which ensures that vo 2 (0;1) holds true and ro = n; the so-called Cambridge equation
(for the case sc = 1). Note that this situation implies that the steady state rate of pro¯t





w : The analysis that follows will
investigate, with the exception of cases where the loan rate is assumed to be close to zero,
see also the section on monetary policy, cases that are close to this special situation.9
We have already indicated that (some) parameters have to be chosen such that mean-
ingful steady state solutions are obtained. Moreover we restrict the consideration of the
dynamics to cases where the rate of pro¯t stays positive and thus do not add further non-
linearities to the model that will guarantee this endogenously, see Flaschel (2009, ch.4) for
the addition of such behavioral nonlinearities. We however allow for cases where c¡1 < 0
holds, where therefore asset holders borrow from workers to ¯nance the investment of their
¯rms (close to the steady state). The debtor creditor relationship between asset holders
and workers may therefore change, but the former will not go bankrupt as long as their
income Yc stays positive.
3 Excessive overconsumption: From an attracting steady state situation
to instability
3.1 The stable excessive overconsumption case
We consider in the following the case of a strongly wage-led goods demand
Y d = C + I = c(vY ¡ i¤a
w) + ¯r([(1 ¡ v)Y ¡ ±K] ¡ roK) + (n + ±)K;
i.e. speci¯cally the case




where obviously Y d depends positively on the wage share v. In this case the Goodwin
subcycle is characterized by stability and the marginal propensity of workers to consume is
very excessive, and maybe empirically beyond reasonable sizes. We therefore consider this
starting case an extreme situation of excessive overconsumption backed up by unrestricted
loans. We have in this case that the denominator D in the IS curve is positive and thus




w + ¯r(± + ro) ¡ n ¡ ±





9It is obvious from the above that the steady state values are of meaningful size. They are also
meaningful in the border case i = 0 (keeping n + ' ¯xed). Note moreover again, that the value of ro has
been adjusted in such a way that the assumption ¯r(¢) = 0 is ful¯lled at the obtained steady state values.
10We thus have for y = N
D the situation D;N > 0 at and around the steady state. This
assumption implies { though goods demand is clearly `wage-led' (which { up to its extent
{ is natural in the case where the marginal propensity to consume is larger than the
investment parameter ¯r) { that the IS-curve depends negatively on the wage share v.10
In this case we therefore get that e®ective (not aggregate) demand, given by the ratio
y, depends negatively on the wage share v (as one would not expect it to be true in an
economy where goods demand is wage led). Note that we are considering in this section
the case where the responsiveness of investment to subnormal pro¯t rate, as measured by
the parameter ¯r; is less than one. The investment behavior of ¯rms is thus still of a fairly
tranquil type.11
The considered situation moreover implies a positive dependence of y on the debt to
capital ratio ¸a
w (around the steady state of the model, to be discussed below). For the






































(1 ¡ v) > 0
which transforms itself directly into corresponding derivatives for vy;r = (1¡v)y¡±: The
above partial derivatives with respect to the state variable v show in particular that these
derivatives do not depend at the steady state on the interest rate i so that the in°uence
of i on the Jacobian of the dynamics is only given when the term
@y
@¸a
w = ci=D is involved.
Note that we will use for brevity yv in place of
@y
@v, etc. in the following.
The negative sign of the derivative yv shows the somewhat striking result that goods
market dynamics are pro¯t-led, though aggregate demand per unit of capital is clearly
wage-led: yd
v = (c ¡ ¯r)y > 0: This indicates that empirical ¯ndings on the role of income
distribution on the market for goods (where we in fact can only be observe empirically
the interactions of demand with supply) which state that the goods market behavior is
pro¯t led (decreases with increases in the wage share) can be completely in line with the
10This situation always holds if the marginal propensity to spend is larger than one and aggregate
demand wage-led, since an increase in the wage share must then be compensated by a decrease in output
in order to restore goods market equilibrium.
11See section 5 for the consideration of the case c < ¯r:
11unobservable fact that planned goods demand depends positively on the wage share (is
wage led). We note also that in the extreme case here considered we have a positive e®ect
of increases in the loan rate on the state of the goods market. This rather counterintuitive
result is a direct consequence of the very excessive consumption case considered here.
The situation we have considered so far gives rise to the following stability proposition.
Proposition 1: Stability for a \normal" range of parameter values
Assume that i is su±ciently small and ¯we su±ciently large. Then: The steady
state of the dynamics (16) { (18) is locally attracting for all empirically relevant
parameter sizes of the model.
This result is maybe not so surprising as it may ¯rst be thought in a signi¯cantly
debt driven economy. Default so far only works as if it were a 'gift' (debt relief) from
the side of asset holders, given to worker households, since the assumed bankruptcy of
part of these latter households (the loss of their homes12) does not yet feedback into the
considered dynamics (since the law of motion for kw is only an appended one). Moreover,
the Goodwin part of the model (the interaction of the state variables v and l is here of a
convergent type, while the only destabilizing feedback loop is the one between the state
variables v and ¸a
w through their positive interaction.13 Debt has a positive e®ect on the
growth rate of the wage share and the latter may have a positive e®ect on the time rate of
change of the debt to capital ratio. But this accelerating mechanism is not yet dominant
in the overall interaction of the three state variables that are here considered.
There is however an element in the considered situation that can lead the investigated
dynamics into a situation where the steady state becomes unstable and where the assumed
degree of wage °exibility will lead the economy towards explosive °uctuations. This case
comes about when it is assumed that the considered excessive overconsumption stimulates
asset holders to invest into real capital at a rate ¯r that is larger than c. In this case we
get yv > 0 and thus a wage - led goods market behavior. Since the stability proof of this
section demanded for a degree of wage °exibility ¯we that is su±ciently high, it is then
very likely that the trace of J :
¯weyvvo ¡ (c ¡ 1)i ¡ ¯rr¸a
w¸a
w ¡ (n + 'd)
becomes positive and the steady state becomes a repelling one.
12and their living in cars or tents as it now happens in the US economy.
13as shown through the entries J13;J31; se the mathematical appendix.
123.2 The unstable mildly excessive overconsumption case
We consider now the only mildly excessive wage-led case
¯r < 1 < c < 1 + (1 ¡ ¯r)(1 ¡ vo)=vo:
In this case we now have a signi¯cantly di®erent situation where D, N < 0 in the goods
market equilibrium expression y = N
D at the steady state. For the partial derivatives of




> 0;(vy)v = y
¯r ¡ 1
D




And for the derivative y¸a






which transforms itself directly into corresponding derivatives for vy;r = (1¡v)y¡±: Note
that all partial derivatives have now the opposite sign as compared to the overconsumption
case considered previously. The sign of the derivative yv > 0 now shows the normal result
that goods market reaction appears as wage-led when aggregate goods demand per unit
of capital is wage-led: yd
v = (c ¡ ¯r)y > 0: Moreover, interest rate e®ects, i.e., rising loan
rates are now contractive: yi < 0 (instead of activity increasing) as one would expect it
intuitively in a debt driven economy. This gives rise to the proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Instability of the mildly excessive consumption case
Assume ¯r < 1 < c < 1+(1¡¯r)(1¡vo)=vo. The steady state of the dynamics
(16) { (18) is locally repelling for empirically plausible choices of the parameter
values of the model.
The case of a mildly excessive overconsumption in the sector of worker households
does therefore not represent a viable situation, in particular since the previously stable
dynamics of the Goodwin substructure with its state variables v;l have now become a
totally unstable one. This is further exempli¯ed by the following proposition which states
that even very low loan rates i cannot be of help in the considered case.
14Note that the holds Y
d
Y < 1 now.
13Proposition 3: Instability for small values of the loan rate
Assume i = 0 < n + 'd. Then: The steady state of the dynamics (16) { (18)
is locally repelling. This then also holds for all loan rates chosen su±ciently
small.
So far we have investigated the parameter situations A and B shown in ¯gure 1. We
have found out that Case B (the excessive overconsumption case) represents by and large
a stable performance of the economy, while Case A (the mildly excessive overconsumption
case) does not provide a viable situation from the economic point of view. The overall
conclusion here therefore is that investment should be stimulated at least to the extent
such that ¯r > 1¡cvo
1¡vo holds true, for example through a loan rate policy that lowers the
loan rate to a su±cient degree such that this inequality can be ensured (assuming that
the parameter ¯r depends negatively on the loan rate i).
Figure 1: A summary of the stability scenarios for a varying parameter ¯r:
Yet this may stimulate investment decisions to such an extent such that situation
C or even situation D becomes established. In situation C the entry J31 in the matrix J
becomes unambiguously positive which increases the negative forces in the Routh-Hurwitz
coe±cient a2: The overall stability situation however is not clear in this case, while it is
fairly obvious that case D represents an unstable case, in particular since we now have
a positive J11 that will destabilize the economy if wage are or are becoming su±ciently
°exible with respect to demand pressure on the market for labor.
In this case ¯r > c we thus again get yv > 0 and thus a wage - led goods market
14behavior. Since the stability proof of section 3 demanded for a degree of wage °exibility
¯we that is su±ciently high it is then very likely that the trace of J :
¯weyvvo ¡ (c ¡ 1)i ¡ ¯rr¸a
w¸a
w ¡ (n + 'd)
then becomes positive and the steady state becomes a repelling one. We will investigate
such a situation in the next section.
4 Credit rationing, reduced consumption and the emergence of mort-
gage crises
Beginning from the case of excessive overconsumption just discussed, we assume now that
asset holders stop lending to workers due to an exogenous change in their risk perception
concerning workers' debt. One may for example assume here that the loan rate i (and
with it on the macro-level inevitably { though unintentionally { the default rate 'd) has
been increasing through asset holders in a stepwise fashion until a level of the default rate
has been reached that persuades asset holders to stop their lending to worker households.
The immediate consequence is that the propensity to consume is forced to the value 1 (or
close to one if some lending still goes on, the case we considered in the preceding section).
In the following we therefore consider the stability features of case c · 1:
We start the investigation from the case c · 1; but su±ciently close to 1. We have in
this situation D < 0, but now in addition also ¸a
wo < 0: The assumed shock to workers'
propensity to consume has an immediate e®ect on goods market equilibrium
y =
ci¸a
w + ¯r(± + ro) ¡ n ¡ ±
(c ¡ ¯r)v + ¯r ¡ 1
; (c ¡ ¯r)v + ¯r ¡ 1 < 0 now.
now.
The change in IS-equilibrium resulting from a change in the parameter c is obtained
by taking the total di®erential of the IS equation as follows:
dc ¢ vy + [(c ¡ ¯r)v + ¯r ¡ 1] ¢ dy = dc ¢ i¸a
w = 0






(c ¡ ¯r)v + ¯r ¡ 1
Viewed from the situation c = 1 we thus get that a positive shock to c increases
economic activity (since the steady state value of ¸a
w is zero at this position, i.e., in
15reversed terms, the jump to a marginal propensity to consume of amount one in the above
considered crisis situation is contractive and would lead the economy into the de°ationary
region (as far as the real wage dynamic is concerned) if it has been at its steady state
position initially.
As steady state position we now have
yo = yp lo = yo=¹ e; ywo = yo ¡ ± ¡ n; ¸a
wo = 0; vo = ywo
and for the employed partial derivatives we get in this case (since the denominator in the




> 0; (vy)v = y
¯r ¡ 1
D
> 0; rv = 0:
For the derivative (vy)¸a
w we in addition now have a negative sign: (vy)¸a
w = ci
D < 0:
Proposition 4 (Full credit rationing implies a repelling steady state)
Assume c = 1. Then: The steady state of the dynamics (16) { (18) is sur-
rounded by explosive forces. This also holds for all marginal propensities c
chosen su±ciently close to 1.
We get from the proof of proposition 4, see the appendix, for the entries of the Jacobian
matrix J of the dynamics at the steady state as su±cient condition for instability the
inequality:
a2 < 0 i® ¡ J12J21 < ¡J11J33 + J13J31:
This condition states that the stability created by the pro¯t-led Goodwin (1967) subcycle
of the model (the interaction between the wage share and the employment rate, here
expressed through the labor intensity ratio l) is overcome by the destabilizing feedback
chain between the wage share v and the debt to capital ratio ¸a
w: Of course, further
instability scenarios may come about through the trace of the matrix J if wages are
su±ciently °exible with respect to the labor market utilization gap, and through the
determinant of J (if ¡J23J31 becomes dominant). The case where workers save in order to
reduce their prevailing level of debt does therefore not at all represent a situation where
recovery and convergence towards the steady state of the economy can be expected.
5 Monetary policy in a mortgage crisis
In order to determine what monetary policy could do in the situation we discussed in the
preceding section we now consider the formulated rise in the loan rate i that triggered the
16crisis in somewhat more detail. We consider for this purpose the situation shown in ¯gure
2.
Figure 2: Loan rate adjustment dynamics
The basic assumption in ¯gure 2 is that the default rate 'd is an increasing function
of the loan rate i and this in the strictly convex form shown in ¯gure 2. We add to this
function the term ro = n and obtain an expression (as a function of the loan rate i) that
show the minimum loan rate needed to obtain as rate of return on loans the (steady state)
rate of pro¯t of ¯rms. We next assume that { under normal conditions { the actual loan
rate is decreased if it exceeds the given rate of pro¯t plus the default rate (viewed as rate
of depreciation of loans). It therefore tends towards the minimum loan rate io when one
starts from the initial situation A for example. Such an adjustment thus leads in the limit
to the loan rate io and thus to a tranquil situation where the loan rate as well as the
default rate are small, a situation that is attracting smaller as well as larger loan rates in
an asymptotically stable way. Yet as the ¯gure 2 shows the basin of attraction of the loan
rate io is limited to the right by the loan rate i1; i.e., the considered stable adjustment
process becomes an unstable one to the right of this rate.
Consider now the case B in ¯gure 2. We here assume that external events have led to
this increase in the loan rate (maybe in a stepwise fashion) since asset holders now insist
{ in place of the above adjustment process { on a loan rate that guarantees a higher rate
of return on their loans than the one in the sector of ¯rms. Assuming that this downward
rigidity of the loan rate eventually leads (through exogenously drive further actions of
asset holders) to a loan rate that is higher than i1 and which pushes the ¯nancial market
17of the economy into the unstable region where the loan rate gives rise to an endogenous
upward spiraling process C (since the rate of return on loans is now lower than the rate of
pro¯t and thus now inducing asset holders to further increases in i). We assume however
that this process comes to an end at the value determined by the double line, since asset
holders then stop giving credit to workers as discussed in the preceding section (due to
the high default rate that accompanies the then existing loan rate). The economy is then
trapped into a situation where the loan rate as well as the default rate is very high and
where the propensity to buy houses is zero and the overall propensity to consume therefore
less than one.
In this still very basic scenario (as far as mortgage crises are concerned) the policy to
be adopted by the central bank (which is now assumed to enter the stage) is still a simple
one. The ¯rst step in the solution to the credit crisis simply is to buy an amount of bad
loans 'c that allows for a loan rate i smaller than i1 for the bad loans ¹ 'd(i)¡'c that then
remain in the sector of asset holders. This increases the reserves of asset holders and must
be conditioned on their acceptance of the minimum loan rate (on the strictly convex curve
in ¯gure 2) that is consistent with the debt default situation they are then facing. If this
acceptance is followed in all subsequent steps we may then expect that the process leading
back to the loan rate io becomes again into being, now in the situation where the overall
propensity of workers to consume is less than one (and where debt of workers is reduced
in each point in time through their now positive savings rate). The question then becomes
how the private sector of the economy (the real part of the economy and the process of
debt de-cumulation) behaves in the situation obtained in this way.
The downward correction of the loan rate just considered is however not yet su±cient in
order to stabilize the economy, since the Jacobian we considered at the end of the preceding
section is plagued by a wage-led situation as far as the entry J11 is concerned and exhibits
a destabilizing feedback mechanism through the entries J13;J31 which are both negative
and thus endangering the positivity of a2. In order to get a situation where the stability
of the private sector can be ensured we consider again the sign of the determinant of J as
given by the expression (21). We continue to investigate the case c < 1;¯r < 1; i.e., the
situation where D < 0 holds true. We assume now a situation where 1 > ¯r > c > 0 has
been established, e.g. through forced savings of worker household, based on their debt the
central bank is now holding.
Simple empirical estimates as they were considered with eq. (21) { or just the assump-
tion that ¯r is su±ciently close to 1 { then ensure that the determinant of the matrix J
is negative. Moreover we have in this case yv < 0;(vy)v > 0;rv < 0;y¸a
w < 0;r¸a
w < 0 and
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This immediately implies the stability of the Goodwin part of the model (the interac-
tion of v;l).
Proposition 5 (Stability for small values of i and °exible wage adjustment)
Assume that the parameter k is su±ciently large and i = n + 'd(i) > 0
su±ciently small. Then: The steady state of the dynamics (16) { (18) is
locally attracting.
In view of what we have shown with respect to ¯gure 2 the ¯rst objective of the
central bank thus should be to support keeping the loan rate su±ciently low. In a next
step consumption should be discouraged or/and investment encouraged. One may for
example assume that the value of ¯r depends negatively on the loan rate i: Improving the
investment climate to a su±cient degree may therefore be one policy option of the central
bank.
The central bank starts by buying a fraction ® of the default volume, the bad loans
'd¸a
w: This increases the disposable income of asset holders15 and leads to an increase of
either their reserve holding R (which we have ignored so far) or their investment, leading
to an adjustment of the parameter ¯r that may become permanent even if the central
bank stops buying bad loans. In the case it continues to do so we have the situation that
bad loans no longer lead to bankruptcy (loss of their homes) of the corresponding worker
households. One may assume in addition that the central bank starts demanding some
low interest payment from them, but we do not consider this here explicitly.
Since asset holders now face less bad loans (1¡®)'d¸a
w { due to the bail-out exercised
by the central bank { we have moreover that the loan rate falls, as it was intended by
the central bank. This induces a further reduction in the amount of bad loans and thus
improves the credit situation worker households are facing. There is less debt default
15Note that we here assume for the disposable income of asset holders the equation:





This however does not alter the steady state of the model, since aggregate defaults remain the same
(implying no change in the law of motion for ¸
a
w), though part of them are now held by the central bank.
19and less bankruptcy (which was accompanied by the destruction of workers' homes) and
cheaper credit for worker households and { as we have argued { increased robustness in
the stability scenario of the private sector that this policy implies.
We summarize the stability analysis of this paper by ¯gure 3 which provides just
another representation of what we have already considered in ¯gure 1. In ¯gure 3 we show
this from the perspective of the slope of the IS-curve with respect to the wage share v
which clearly shows where the economy may be a viable one and where not. Note that the
viability domain is exactly the one where our Keynes-Goodwin model seems to be pro¯t
led in the way comparable to the Goodwin (1967) growth cycle model.
Figure 3: An alternative summary of the stability scenarios for a varying parameter ¯r:











The domains B and C are therefore the ones where the economy may be able to
reproduce itself in the long-run. The care of the central bank should then only be to
keep the investment climate in an appropriate range and the loan rate on workers debt
reasonably low. Nevertheless there are still a variety of cases conceivable where there
is a latent tendency towards instability (approached through investment weaknesses or
investment booms), since in particular the regime of overconsumption may not be the
20best of all accumulation regimes.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we considered an initial situation of stable excessive overconsumption of
worker households, and from there a situation of strict credit rationing by asset holders.
We then considered actions that rescue the economy from this last instability scenario
and that imply a solution that leads the economy back to economic stability based on
investment stimuli and monetary policy regarding the loan and the default rate on the
credit market.
In this latter type of economy, the loan rate will fall to a low value again and workers'
debt will reduce in time through their now positive savings. In the limit, this economy
would even converge to a situation where workers are lending to asset holders, since they
have a positive savings rate in the steady state. Yet, we view this phase as representing only
a transient phase where the economy recovers to a certain degree from too high mortgage
debt to its normal functioning, maybe subsequently followed again by the emergence of
some behavior which leads the macroeconomy back to the stable overconsumption situation
we started from. The sequence of events analyzed in this paper there may repeat itself in
actual historical events.
In view of the quotation from Minsky's work at the beginning of this paper it may
therefore well be { if this transient phase is long enough { that the ¯rst type of excessive
overconsumption reappears and that the whole process starts again, though possibly in a
di®erent historical garment.
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22Mathematical appendix
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For the sign of the determinant of this Jacobian we therefore have to investigate the







¡(c ¡ ¯r) ¡¹ e c
D
c ¡ 1 0 ¡(1 ¡ vo) c
D
(c ¡ 1)(¯r ¡ 1) + ¯r(c ¡ 1)¸a






The sign of this determinant is therefore equal to the sign of its following sub-determinant:
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
1 ¡(1 ¡ vo) c
D
¯r ¡ 1 + ¯r¸a





For the sign of the latter determinant we get the expression




wo + (1 ¡ vo)
c
D
(¯r ¡ 1 + ¯r¸a
wo)
which ¯nally simpli¯es to
c ¡ 2 + (1 ¡ vo)
c
D
(¯r ¡ 1) (21)
This expression is negative if there holds ¯r · 1 and if we assume that c < 4=3
which surely is a plausible upper limit for the marginal propensity to consume. 17 The
16i = n + 'd. Note that the c ¡ 2 in the Jacobian J is due to this assumption. Note also that we use
the abbreviation k = ¯we=lo.
17In the case c > ¯r > 1 we get from D = (c ¡ ¯r)vo + ¯r ¡ 1 > ¯r ¡ 1 > 0 the inequality
c ¡ 2 + (1 ¡ vo)
c
D
(¯r ¡ 1) < c ¡ 2 + (1 ¡ vo)c < 1:5c ¡ 2 < 0
if c < 4=3;vo > 0:5 holds true, i.e., we get a negative determinant jJj(= ¡a3) for all empirically plausible
parameter values c > 1 and vo =
yo¡±¡n
yo :
23assumption on the size of c also implies that the trace of J(= ¡a1) is negative as well. For
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A su±cient assumption for obtaining a2 > 0 (much more than is actually needed)
therefore is ¯r(1 + ¸a
wo) < 1: It seems however more appropriate to assume that the loan
rate i is chosen su±ciently small,18 such that { should the considered determinant be
negative { it is dominated by the ¯rst principal minor
kyovo(1¡c)
D ¯ryo:
The remaining Routh-Hurwitz condition for local asymptotic stability is:
a1a2 ¡ a3 > 0 where a1 = ¡ trace J;a3 = ¡jJj:
The determinant of J is however dominated by the remaining terms in a1a2; if the ad-
justment speed of money wages ¯we is chosen su±ciently large, since it enters a1;a2;a3
linearly with a positive slope and thus in a1a2 through a positively sloped quadratic term.
We therefore in sum have
a1 > 0;a2 > 0;a3 > 0;a1a2 ¡ a3 > 0
for the coe±cients of the characteristic polynomial of the matrix J (the Routh-Hurwitz
conditions) and have thus shown the local asymptotic stability of the steady state of the
model.19 This concludes the proof of proposition 1.


























and can thus assume that this determinant is always positive for values of c¡1;i that are of
empirical relevance (under a relatively normal working of the economy). This assumption
18see the boldface expression in the last formula.
19This also holds true for all 1 ¸ ¯r < c:
24does also no longer imply that the trace of J is negative. And for the sum of the principal















(c ¡ 1)(vy)v ¡ ¯rrv¸a
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We conjecture here that also the second determinant of this expression is very likely
to be negative. The validity of the conditions
a1 > 0;a2 > 0;a3 > 0;a1a2 ¡ a3 > 0
on the coe±cients of the characteristic polynomial of the matrix J (the Routh-Hurwitz
conditions) is therefore in general hurt from various perspectives, which implies the propo-
sition.
Proof of proposition 3: It is easily shown that the sign structure of the Jacobian is in
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This immediately implies the instability of the (wage-led!) Goodwin part of the model
(the interaction of v;l), since the subsystem corresponding to the state variables v;l does
not depend on the third state variable ¸a
w: The real parts of the eigenvalues are therefore
not all negative, a fact that extends to all i su±ciently small, since the eigenvalues depend
continuously on the parameters of the model.
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This immediately implies the instability of the dynamics, since two of the principal
minors of order 2 are zero while the third one is negative, i.e., there holds a2 < 0. This
proves the proposition.
Note that the determinant of the Jacobian J is zero in the situation c = 1, and nonzero
(positive or negative) for c < 1: There will be one eigenvector direction where the dynamics
is on a very slow track, and there is in addition always one unstable (and one stable20)
root, where the former drives the system away from the steady state.





























Proof of proposition 5:
Proof: We have already a1 = ¡trace J > 0;a3 > 0: Choosing k su±ciently large also
gives a2 > 0 if the entries in the last column of J are made su±ciently small by choosing
a low value of the loan rate i: The latter situation also ensures a1a2 ¡a3 > 0; since a3 can
be made small relative to a1a2 in this way.
20Since a2 < 0 holds.
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